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hough  philosophers  hold  strong  views  about 
whether humans have free will and whether free 
will is compatible with determinism and mecha-
nism, there is no universal definition of freedom of 
the will, perhaps to the detriment of the debate. How free does a 
will have to be—what type of freedom must a will have—to ap-
propriately be called a free will? Many answer that a free will is 
free enough that the agent can be held morally responsible; hav-
ing a free will is “just to satisfy the metaphysical requirement of 
being responsible for one's action.”1 Yet this definition certainly 
would fail to capture the views of others. The existence of semi-
compatibilists,2 who believe moral responsibility is compatible 
with determinism but free will may not be, proves that when 
some philosophers discuss freedom of the will, they are employ-
ing a definition very different from this one.  
Others might answer the definitional question by sug-
gesting that freedom of the will is a property held only by a will 
that has all of the sorts of freedom worth caring about. This defini-
tion, I believe, is better than the first, yet an even better one can 
be given if we answer the question it leaves open: Which sorts of 
freedom are worth caring about? Daniel Dennett suggests we 
should care only about those sorts of freedom that are not 
“incoherently conceived blesssings”—a freedom is meaningful 
and worth wanting only if we can conceive of beings with that 
freedom in some coherently possible world3 Thus, Dennett says, 
“guilty-before-the-eyes-of-God” responsibility,4  the impossible 
sort Galen Strawson calls “ultimate moral responsibility,”5 is not 
worth caring about. This freedom appears to require an incoher-
ent sort of metaphysical determination of the will not represent-
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ed by determinism, mechanism, agent causation, Kantian liber-
tarianism,6 or any other imaginable metaphysical hypothesis 
about the will. On the one hand, just eternal suffering in hell 
seems to require that our transgressions aren’t externally caused, 
yet it also seems to require that we act for reasons rather than 
nonrationally, in which case our reasons presumably would 
have some sort of causal—if not necessary—influence on our 
wills.7 Because the sort of freedom that grounds ultimate moral 
responsibility is incoherent, Dennett would say it is not worth 
caring about, so recognizing that we lack this sort of freedom 
should not lead us to be free will skeptics. Is he right to assert 
this as a general rule? 
In this paper, I defend a definition of free will according 
to which a will is free if it has all of the sorts of freedom worth 
caring about. However, I attempt to refute Dennett’s answer to 
the question of which freedoms are worth caring about. I main-
tain that a freedom can be worth caring about even if it is inco-
herent, i.e. even if it is not possible to imagine a world in which 
humans have it. I argue that Dennett’s condition should be re-
placed by the following: A type of free will is worth caring about 
if (but not only if) one took for granted and cared about this sort 
of freedom prereflectively (before reflecting on the philosophical 
problems concerning free will). After defending this definition, I 
explain why it leads me to identify as a free will skeptic, despite 
the fact that I agree almost entirely with compatibilist accounts 
of free will like Hilary Bok’s.8 As the reader might suspect, I de-
fend my free will skepticism by arguing that although I possess 
many types of freedom worth caring about, I lack a certain type 
of freedom I took for granted and cared about prereflectively: 
the sort that would justify my feelings of pride in my achieve-
ments.  
To make this argument, I review what I take to be a par-
ticularly strong compatibilist account, Hilary Bok’s “standpoint 
compatibilism,”9 and explain why even it cannot completely sal-
vage pride. I also suggest that the freedom required to salvage 
pride is incoherent and impossible in the same way that the free-
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dom for ultimate responsibility is. I will not argue that for a ra-
tional agent, pride to any extent is impossible but only that pride 
to the extent I may have felt it prereflectively is. At the end of the pa-
per, I briefly address a possible Strawson-inspired10 response to 
my argument, according to which pride is not to be justified by a 
certain metaphysical view of the will but, rather, is a natural re-
sponse justified by the satisfaction of certain “internal criteria.”11 
 
I: Defense of the All-In Definition of Free Will 
 Previously I distinguished between the two definitions of 
free will. The first I will call the traditional definition. According to 
the traditional definition, to say that a will is free is to say that it 
satisfies the conditions for moral responsibility. The problem this 
definition faces, likely due to its antiquated nature, is a failure to 
recognize the scope of the threat imposed on our views about 
human agency by reflection upon the metaphysics of the will. 
When we reflect on how a will might come to be, it is not only 
moral responsibility that is threatened prima facie but other 
treasured aspects of our agency. Thus, Thomas Nagel says of a 
naturalistic view of human action: “That an account of freedom 
can be given which is compatible with the objective view… is not 
the case. All such accounts fail to allay the feeling that, looked at 
from far enough outside, agents are helpless…”12 Although our 
wills are causally efficacious, as free will advocates tend to un-
derscore, we are still mere links in a causal chain, not uncon-
strained authors of our lives as we imagine and cherish prere-
flectively. Surely related to this notion of authorship is our pride 
in achievements for which we prereflectively take ourselves to be 
ultimately responsible.  
If we think the types of free will required for ultimate au-
thorship of or pride in our actions are worth caring about (or 
even that it is conceivable that free will is worth caring about for 
reasons other than the fact that it grounds moral responsibility), 
then we should reject the traditional definition of free will. If we 
take free will to have a biconditional relationship with moral re-
sponsibility, as the traditional definition does, we must think 
moral responsibility is so central to who we are as humans that 
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no other freedom could conceivably be worth wanting. I find the 
traditional definition thus evidently absurd and endorse as its 
replacement the all-in definition of free will: We have freedom of 
the will if and only if we have all of the sorts of freedom worth 
caring about. 
 
II: Which Freedoms are Worth Caring About? 
 This definition raises a further question: Which types of 
freedom are worth caring about? Much as they have done with 
the traditional definition of free will, some philosophers have 
limited themselves to types of freedom that seem wholly arbi-
trary. Dennett asserts that we should not care about types of 
freedom that are “inconceivable blessings.”13 Upon learning that 
we lack a certain kind of freedom, we should only be tempted by 
free will skepticism if we can “conceive of beings whose wills 
are freer than our own,” Dennett says.14 If Dennett were right, 
my argument would fail, for as I will suggest later, the kind of 
freedom implied by the pride we prereflectively take in our ac-
complishments is incoherent and thus inconceivable. However, I 
argue that we should reject Dennett’s rule.  
Although Dennett remarks throughout his book that cer-
tain types of freedom are inconceivable, he never supports his 
rule by telling us why we should not care about them. This rule 
faces a problem bigger than a lack of argumentative support, 
however. Imagine what it would mean in the following hypo-
thetical scenario. If, in some hypothetical world, we one day re-
alized that the freedom required for any form of moral responsi-
bility was impossible—from consequentialist moral responsibil-
ity to the expression of reactive attitudes to Galen Strawson’s 
ultimate responsibility—Dennett’s rule would require us to still 
believe firmly that we had all the free will we needed. This 
would be true even if moral responsibility had been as integral 
to our interpersonal relationships and societal institutions as it is 
in this world. One day we had never thought to question wheth-
er these practices so central to our lives were justified; the next 
day we realized we were wrong to endorse these “inconceivable 
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blessings”; yet Dennett would have us believe that nothing had 
been lost—that we still had all of the freedoms worth wanting. 
Another absurd consequence of Dennett’s rule is that impossibil-
ism about free will is not even a coherent position; as soon as we 
determine a freedom to be impossible, it somehow loses its 
meaningfulness and desirability. 
Based on the preceding hypothetical scenario, I suggest 
the following rule as a replacement: A type of freedom of the 
will is worth caring about if (but not only if) one took for granted 
and cared about this sort of freedom prereflectively. Even if a 
prereflectively cherished freedom of will is, upon philosophical 
reflection, incoherent, to still recoil at free will skepticism is to 
deceive oneself into the comforting belief that nothing has been 
lost—that our increased understanding of the world and of our 
minds has not revealed to us that we are not as free as we once 
supposed. 
 
III: Our Prereflective Views and Pride 
Over the last few hundred years, as scientists and philos-
ophers have come to have a better understanding of our world, 
causation, and the will, the truth has often been disconcerting—
at least, at first glance. For the most part, philosophers have fo-
cused on the threat to moral responsibility. Some have argued 
that because we are mere products of causal history, unable to 
deviate from our predetermined course unless by randomness, 
many of our moral practices—like praising and blaming our-
selves and others for their actions—ought to be called into 
doubt,15, 16 and countless others. Later I will argue that moral re-
sponsibility is not threatened, but as the rule I have established 
dictates, we would be wrong to terminate our inquiry here. Our 
wills might thankfully be free enough for moral responsibility, 
yet the modern understanding of causation and of our wills may 
still reveal to us a loss of something substantive. 
My prereflective view of my choices is one strikingly at 
odds with every reasoned, careful view that I can conceive of my 
will. My first-person, introspective experience was almost un-
questionable evidence that I had unconstrained control as the 
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ultimate author of my life. My choices were things I made—as 
they still are even in light of this new understanding—but they 
were not also things that happened to me. Never did I imagine my 
actions could be fully explained as products of the remote past 
before I was born and the laws of nature17—that though my 
choices are causally efficacious, and my past choices can cause 
my future choices, they are all “the necessary result of the state 
of the universe… say, at a moment in the Cretaceous period…”18 
As long as we imagine that the will is caused with some proba-
bility by neural events, no admission of indeterminacy will bring 
the modern view in line with my prereflective one. The sugges-
tion that my actions are entirely products of the remote past be-
fore I was born, the laws of nature, and randomness is no more 
comforting. Perhaps I—i.e. whatever metaphysically mysterious 
entity can appropriately be called my self—cause my choices, 
and my causing my choices is itself uncaused, so that we need 
not trace my choices to things external to me.19, 20 
If we circumvent this problem common to event-causal 
views, however, we only trade one problem for another. Prere-
flectively, and still now, I am so sure that I act for reasons—that I 
will choose whichever alternative I believe I have most reason to 
choose—but my ordering of alternatives must be causally deter-
mined. As long as my choices are intelligible in terms of charac-
ter traits I have and reasons I find compelling, my choices will 
have external causes, and I will lose the ultimate authorship I 
believed in prereflectively. However, I have not yet explained 
why the freedom implied by ultimate authorship is worth caring 
about. If we are to be free will skeptics on the grounds that we 
lack the freedom for ultimate authorship, we first ought to estab-
lish why this is a meaningful freedom, a task to which I now 
turn. 
Some might consider pride an ignoble thing to care about. 
I, on the other hand, will insist that pride is something we tend 
to care about immensely and is rather important to a well-lived 
life. In order to do this and dispel any misconceptions the reader 
might have, I think it will be most useful to precisely character-
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ize the kind of pride I have in mind. By pride, I mean roughly 
what the first definition of in the New Oxford American Diction-
ary describes: “a feeling or deep pleasure or satisfaction derived 
from one's own achievements.” For me, however, pride does not 
entail what is described by this same dictionary’s third defini-
tion, the definition responsible for pride’s negative connotation: 
The pride to which I refer is not “the quality of having an exces-
sively high opinion of oneself or one's importance”; it is not vani-
ty, nor is it ostentatiousness. It is not the sort of self-centered con-
cern with one’s achievements that would motivate him to ignore 
his duties to others in pursuit of his own interests. This pride is 
merely the satisfaction one derives from feeling accomplished 
and exceptional. If I perform exceptionally on an exam, become a 
very successful business owner after years of hard work, or am 
admitted to an excellent graduate program, I feel pride not be-
cause this achievement is a step toward a better future but simp-
ly because I find satisfaction in my being exceptional in itself. 
I hope that at this point, the reader agrees that this sort of 
pride in one’s achievements is, for most of us, very important to 
a well-lived life. Perhaps the most admirable of those among us 
are driven to succeed in their hobbies, academic pursuits, and 
careers only because this success is a means to some other end 
like helping others, providing for those they care about, or build-
ing the sorts of futures and lives they want to have. However, 
most are motivated to a considerable extent to succeed by a de-
sire for the feeling of pride—because we want to feel as though 
we are excellent at whatever it is we enjoy. Though pride may be 
far from the most important part of lives, if the modern under-
standing of causation and of our wills were to take it from us, it 
would be absurd to suggest that nothing substantive had been 
lost. 
Prereflectively, I never questioned the rationality of feel-
ing pride. I believed that somehow, I acted for reasons, yet my 
decisions and my efforts were not caused, instead originating 
largely within me. A wise decision to stay up late working on a 
project or good performance on an exam could be traced back 
Why I am a Free Will Skeptic 
 
48 
along the causal chain to me—as they still can in light of the 
modern understanding—but no further, and certainly not to the 
beginning of time or the occurrence of a random event. If they 
could, they would appear, though largely attributable to my 
character, to be matters of luck—of having been “dealt a good 
hand”— since they are ultimately products of factors outside of 
my control. Free will advocates have argued extensively that this 
does not threaten our freedom of will, but I will argue that they 
have been successful only in salvaging the freedom required for 
moral responsibility—not that required for our feelings of pride. 
To do this, I examine Bok’s account of freedom and responsibil-
ity as the compatibilist account with the most promise. 
 
IV: Where Free Will Adovcates Have Suceeded:  
Responsibility and Blame 
Bok’s account is often called standpoint compatibilism be-
cause it takes freedom of the will to arise naturally from the 
standpoint of practical deliberation.21 Bok argues that when we 
are engaged in practical deliberation, it is both unavoidable and 
rational to regard as possible courses of action not solely what 
we will be caused by natural laws to do but also all of those al-
ternatives we would do if we chose to do them.22 Some actions 
may not be among my alternatives because they are beneath 
consideration or impossible, e.g. traveling to the moon.23 Never-
theless, because while an agent deliberates “it is impossible…for 
her to predict the outcome of her choice…” from the practical 
standpoint she has reason to regard herself as free to do any ac-
tion she would perform if she chose it.24 At this point, the incom-
patibilist may wonder how this seemingly superficial freedom 
could be sufficiently robust to justify moral responsibility; it 
seems one’s will is free solely due to one’s epistemically limited 
standpoint. Bok’s answer is simple but compelling.  
The freedom that arises from the practical standpoint is 
exactly the kind necessary for moral evaluation, blame, and im-
provement.25 When we are engaged in practical reasoning, Bok 
explains, we must employ “some conception of the kinds of ac-
tions we wish to perform or to avoid, the kinds of persons we 
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wish to be, the kinds of characteristics we wish to have or to 
avoid having, and so forth.”26 “The collection of considerations 
that an agent regards as giving rise to reasons for action” Bok 
calls the agent’s “standards.”27 Anyone who engages in practical 
reasoning as means of governing his behavior, whether his 
standards are those of a moral saint or of a “world-class terror-
ist,” must believe he ought to do everything he can to live up to 
those standards, for the better he lives up to his standards the 
closer he is to the person he ideally wishes to be. We do not 
translate our standards into action with perfect reliability, how-
ever. “Our character affects the extent to which we live up to our 
standards of conduct, and the extent to which we perform those 
acts that, if asked, we would claim that we have most reason to 
perform… If I lack the confidence to act on my own judgments 
when others disagree with me, or the strength to resist what I 
take to be temptations, then I will often fail to act as I think I 
should,” Bok explains.28 Because any person who engages in 
practical reasoning has both standards and a character, she has, 
“in virtue of that fact, an interest in improving her character.”29 
From this fact also arises the need for and justification of 
blame. If an outcome that is, according to my standards, subopti-
mal issues from one of my character traits, I have reason to blame 
myself for that outcome. If my character had been different, this 
outcome would not have occurred, and I would have lived up to 
my standards. As Bok says, “The fact that I failed to do some-
thing that I could have done [in the sense of could relevant to the 
practical standpoint] and should have done…must reflect some-
thing about me; and therefore any point at which I failed to ap-
ply my standards correctly must reveal some flaw in my charac-
ter that I have reason to try to correct.”30 Guilt for my transgres-
sions is a natural occurrence, Bok says, because I care deeply that 
the world comes into line with my standards and I recognize that 
it is because of my character, over which I have practical control, 
that in this instance it did not.31 On the other hand, when I live 
up to my standards, I have reason to praise myself and find satis-
faction in the fact that I have the kind of character that allows me 
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to live and do as I think best. For responsibility and blame, the 
fact that I can trace along the causal chain from my transgres-
sions all of the way to events in the remote past and thus beyond 
my control is irrelevant; as long as the causal chain does pass 
through my character, a point at which my choices to improve 
my character can make a difference, I have reason to hold myself 
responsible. Bok’s account is very successful in salvaging moral 
responsibility, but is pride thus salvaged as well? I will argue 
that it is not. 
 
V: Where Free Will Advocates Have Failed: Pride 
In the last section, I said that on Bok’s account, if I live up 
to my standards, I have reason to praise myself and find satisfac-
tion in the fact that I have the kind of character that allows me to 
live and do as I think best. It might seem at first that Bok has sal-
vaged pride or something very similar, for what this describes is 
a feeling of satisfaction derived from the recognition that one is 
living in the way he takes to be most successful. However, this 
feeling is in reality not the sort of pride I described earlier. When 
one derives satisfaction from the fact that he is able to live up to 
his standards, it is because he cares deeply that the world comes 
into line with those standards; this is not the same as pride, a 
satisfaction derived from the fact that one feels ultimately re-
sponsible for his excellence. Let us take for example an agent 
whose standards tell him it is best to meet those who are mean 
to him with kindness. He will be satisfied when he has the char-
acter that allows him to do this consistently because he cares 
deeply that mean people are treated with kindness, and he rec-
ognizes that in shaping the good character he now has, he has 
done all he can do to promote these good outcomes. This feeling 
of satisfaction is very distinct from a feeling of pride, which I 
take to be a feeling of satisfaction with one’s own achievement. 
The former type of satisfaction stems from the obtainment of 
what one cares about, whereas the latter is a satisfaction with 





Bok’s account shows that we are responsible for our ac-
tions in virtue of our ability to improve our characters, but it 
cannot show that we are ultimately responsible for our charac-
ters themselves. It is my character that leads to my academic 
achievements, for example. To what extent can I feel pride in 
these? The answer depends on how thoughtfully I reflect on the 
modern understanding; on the fact that my character is not self-
created and it as well as my achievements can be fully explained 
as products of things completely outside of my control; and on 
the fact that while my achievements are things I do, they are also 
things that happen to me. When I attend to these facts, I feel sig-
nificantly less pride than when I do not. Perhaps we could say 
that when I choose not to attend to these facts so that I can feel 
pride, I deceive myself by ignoring facts that upon careful reflec-
tion would change my views; I shield myself from the ugly 
truth. Can we really say that the modern understanding has not 
revealed to us any significant loss if I have to ignore certain facts 
to feel pride to the extent I once felt it? The modern understand-
ing has revealed to me that I lack what I take to be a rather im-
portant freedom: the freedom of will required to rationally—upon 
rational reflection—feel the pride I did in my prereflective stage. It 
is worse than this, however. Even when I do not actively reflect 
upon this newfound understanding, I now feel significantly less 
pride than I did prereflectively. The recognition of how my will 
really comes to be affects my conception of my successes even 
when I divert my focus. 
At this point the reader may offer a response in the spirit 
of P.F. Strawson’s Freedom and Resentment.32 Could pride, like 
resentment and gratitude, be a feeling immune to the sort of ra-
tional scrutiny to which I have subjected it? If resentment is a 
natural response to ill will to be justified by the truth of its prop-
ositional content—that someone really has demonstrated mali-
cious intent—rather than by a metaphysical picture of the will, 
perhaps pride is similarly justified only by some “internal crite-
ria”33 such as one’s actually having achieved something.  
Whether this response works, I suggest, may differ from 
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person to person. It is a question to be answered by one’s own 
experience. I admit that if one feels the utmost pride simply in 
virtue of the fact that he has achieved, despite that achieve-
ment’s causal origins, then he does not have good reason to call 
himself a free will skeptic. Though the modern understanding 
has revealed to him that he is not the ultimate author of his life, 
it has not revealed an unfreedom worth caring about. However, 
drawing upon my personal experience, I can say that this Straw-
sonian response fails in at least some cases. For those whose ra-
tional reflection on their freedoms and unfreedoms of the will 
strips from them a feeling they once took for granted and cared 
about deeply, we cannot say the type of freedom they now real-
ize they lack is unimportant. With these particular cases in mind, 
we must acknowledge that if we accept the all-in definition of 
free will, we cannot say that free will and any sort of metaphysi-
cal hypothesis about the will are objectively compatible. 
  
VI: Closing Thoughts 
I call myself a free will skeptic not because the modern 
understanding has revealed to me that meaningful agency was 
only a delusion. Compatibilists have been extremely successful 
in salvaging some of the most important aspects of our agency: 
the possibility of deliberation; the significance of deliberation 
and efficacy of the will; and many of the most common forms of 
moral responsibility. Nor do I call myself a free will skeptic be-
cause I no longer feel any pride at all. Because pride is rooted in 
humans’ psychological nature, remnants remain even after ra-
tional scrutiny has done its best. I cannot deny, however, that 
this rational scrutiny has taken a significant toll on something I 
once took for granted and cared about deeply. When I call my-
self a free will skeptic, I am not supposing that the modern view 
of my will has shown me to be dismally unfree. I have many of 
the important freedoms of will that make human agency special. 
But when I say that I am a free will skeptic, I acknowledge that 
this new way of understanding my character, my actions, and 




alization: Something I took for granted and cared deeply about 
in my prereflective stage is now gone, and I am not as free as I 
once unquestioningly supposed myself to be. 
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